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Abstract 
In 2015 and 2017, two large contracts for nuclear decommissioning were terminated early by 
the UK Government.  Rather than re-tender, Government took direct ownership and control 
of Sellafield and began an inquiry into other sites’ management.     The problems with the 
contract model for management of the UK’s nuclear legacy stem from an inability to 
adequately specify contracts in uncertain environments.  The embrace of management and 
operations contracts for all sites after nationalised ownership limited the range of ‘tools’ to 
manage the nuclear legacy.  This highlights the role of state capabilities alongside 
incentivised private sector relationships in contemporary governance. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom was one of the first nations to develop military and civilian uses of 
atomic energy.  This pioneering development made the UK the third nation to possess 
2 
atomic weapons, and the first to open a civilian power-producing atomic power station.  
However, pioneering achievements of the 1950s have become significant financial, 
environmental and radiological hazards in the 2000s.  Throughout the majority of this time 
the UK nuclear industry was state owned and operated, but in 2002 government signalled its 
intention to radically alter the governance of the industry to create “competitive markets for 
clean-up contracts” which government believed would “stimulate innovation and 
improvements in safety and operating standards” by drawing upon the best available skills 
across the globe (DTI 2002: 13).  However, two issues complicated the involvement of 
private companies in the resolution of the nuclear legacy; firstly, a straightforward 
privatisation was tried in the 1980s and failed due to the unquantifiable financial risks 
(Rhodes et al 2014: 35); and, secondly the requirement for the regulatory licence to operate 
the nuclear site to be non-transferrable between companies means that at each site the 
operator, the Site Licence Company, must be an enduring entity (NDA 2011a: 2.2).  To 
overcome these issues and facilitate the involvement of private companies, government had 
to retain ownership of the sites (and ultimately the risks) and transfer ownership of the site 
licence companies as enduring entities.  This required a new structure of governance for the 
nuclear legacy to be implemented, which drew heavily on the Management and Operations 
(M&O) contracts used in the nuclear industry the United States.  In a 2002 White Paper 
government signalled its intention to split the ownership and management of the nuclear 
legacy (DTI 2002).  The Energy Act 2004 gave legal force to a new non-departmental public 
body, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, which took ownership of the sites and 
competitively tendered for the ownership of the companies at each site. 
 
The most complex nuclear site in the UK is the Sellafield site in Cumbria in the North West of 
England.  It is home to the UK’s first nuclear reactors, and subsequently became a site 
encompassing the entire ‘closed’ nuclear fuel cycle, including facilities for the reprocessing 
of spent nuclear fuel, manufacture of new fuel and management of the hazardous wastes 
produced.  The result is one of the most complex nuclear sites in the world and a technically 
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difficult, expensive and environmentally hazardous decommissioning challenge.  Due to an 
unforeseen set of circumstances, explored in more detail later, rather than being one of the 
last sites in the UK to be competitively contracted as anticipated, Sellafield became the 
second.  It also became the first site where the contracting out of the management and 
operation was to be reversed.  The NDA developed a new governance architecture to 
remove the private ownership of the site and return Sellafield to direct governmental control, 
but facilitate private sector involvement in the operation of the site at a level below 
ownership.  Subsequently, in 2017, the contract for the decommissioning of the UK’s first 
nuclear reactors was also cancelled (HC Deb 27 March 2017 c554WS). 
 
This paper uses the Sellafield site as a case-study to explore why the contracting model for 
the nuclear legacy was not a success.  This paper has two main aims; firstly, to analyse why 
simple state ownership and the privatisation of site management both faced problems; and, 
secondly to make wider points about the role of government in the nuclear legacy 
specifically, and in governance in general.  To achieve these aims the first section explores 
the changing theory and practice of governance in contemporary society.  The second 
section introduces the history of the nuclear legacy with specific reference to Sellafield, to 
place the paper its proper context.  In the third section the changes to the governance of the 
nuclear legacy are analysed, from nationalised ownership through privatisation and the 
current hybrid system.  The final section discusses why governance models for the nuclear 
legacy have changed and makes wider points regarding the role of government in the 
governance of the nuclear legacy specifically and in the governance of contemporary society 
in general. 
 
2 Rescaling governance 
 
Broadly defined, governance is “the means for authoritatively allocating resources and 
exercising control and co-ordination’’ (Rhodes 1996: 653).  The overarching aim being 
4 
“steering a society or polity” within a defined border (Lowndes 2001: 1961).  Governance 
embraces “quasi- and non-state actors in a range of public–private partnerships” which can 
be characterised as the “shift from government to governance” (MacLeod and Goodwin 
1999: 506).   Thus, rather than a stark state/non-state or government/governance divide, the 
reality is of a continuum where a variety of systems of governing embrace various actors 
across sectors playing a diverse array of roles (Bulkeley 2005: 877; Kern and Bulkeley 2009: 
311) and which “do not rest on a recourse to the authority and sanctions of government” 
(Wilson 2003: 318) but include government as an important player among a wider array of 
actors.  This has “blurred” the boundaries between the state and market (Allen 2004: 29).  In 
this context of a complex array of actors and functions characterising modern governance it 
is helpful to conceive of state power as a wide range of specific ‘capabilities’ (MacLeod and 
Jones 2007: 1187) which can be (temporarily) transferred to and exercised by non-state 
actors, where “it is not the national state as such, in its totality, but particular components 
that are undergoing denationalization” (Sassen 2008: 8).  The partial denationalisation of the 
state as specific functions, or capabilities, which are transferred to the private sector results 
in the creation of markets, where previously there were none, which are neither fully public 
nor entirely private (Sassen 2008: 199).  In the modern era therefore the state has withdrawn 
from certain functions, transferred others to private and other non-state actors, retained 
others and generally delivers functions in more complex ways which has led to different 
interpretations of the “new geography of governance” such as have variously been called 
‘glocalisation’, or the ‘hollowing-out’ of the functions of the nation state (Bulkeley 2005: 882).   
 
These changes in the way we are governed, enabled by technological and geo-political 
changes which removed limits upon the spatial expansion of markets and economic activity 
(Swyngedouw 1989: 35), is leading to increasingly fragmented sub-national places (Sassen 
2008: 265).  As a result, while the “discretionary powers of the state” to shape national 
economies has declined, the importance of local conditions increased (Swyngedouw 1989: 
31).  Thus, as a result of the “twin processes of rescaling” (Swyngedouw 2004: 25) the sub-
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national has become a key site for governance and economic activity in a heavily inter-
connected global system. The governance landscape is therefore “fragmented or 
‘splintered’” (Coaffee and Healey 2003: 1981) and local areas become “sites of power” (Held 
et al 1999: 28) where the different spatialities of the local and global interact (Sassen 2008: 
394).  The rescaling of elements of state authority which contribute to the rise in importance 
of sub-national scales of economic activity and regulation did not happen by accident, but 
involved “the necessary participation of national states” in rescaling elements of their 
“exclusive authority” (Sassen 2008: 5-6).  This has led to a multi-level governance 
environment with a particular proliferation of a jurisdictions which are “flexible and task 
specific” with memberships which “criss-cross judicial boundaries” (Faludi 2012: 203).  This 
is Type-II multi-level governance (Marks and Hooghe 2004).  One of the major drivers of 
Type-II governance is change in the way government exercises its authority through 
privatisation, outsourcing, administrative decentralization and other diversification of modes 
of governing (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25).  However, the assertion that this necessarily 
diminishes the role of government (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25) is contested.  Baker (2015: 
250-251) argues that “the notion that government has become a diminished entity … whose 
powers have been constrained or transferred” is overly simplistic and that government 
retains a “peculiar position” as “the actor of last resort who determines the rules of the game 
whilst guaranteeing the integrity of the network”.  Thus, “far from being a form of placeless 
power”, authority has a complex spatiality where rather than power being “exchanged more 
or less in tact between scales” (MacLeod and Jones 2007: 1197) instead government has 
become “centralised yet dispersed” (Allen 2004: 27).   
 
A weakness of multi-level governance is its poor account of “the practice of governance” 
which reveals the unique role government can still play (Baker 2015: 250).   
Over the course of the past 60 years, the way in which the state operates has changed.  As 
markets have opened up, both public and private sectors have been affected.  Public service 
was at one point thought of as a “‘Jesuitical corps’ highly insulated from the general labour 
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market”, differentiated in the way it works, is paid, staff hired and promoted and is infused 
with a strong focus on hierarchy and generalised rules which limit discretionary power of 
public servants particularly in handing money, letting contracts and hiring where the 
‘Jesuitical corps’ meets the ‘corrupt world’ (Osborne 2002: 14).  The growth of traditional 
public administration, dominant in the very statist post-war years, seemed to be “the one 
thing certain about our future” (Schumpeter 1952: 294).  However, forty years later the UK 
civil service was barely half the size and there was a “return to regulated private ownership 
for virtually all of its major public utilities” (Hood 1995: 165).  New Public Management, which 
argued “for a public service less insulated from the private sector and for greater managerial 
discretion in the handling of staff and resources” (Hood 1995: 168) became dominant 
through the 1980s.  NPM’s key ‘doctrines’ (Hood 1991: 4-5) are consequently focussed on 
the import of private sector management into the public sector, particularly measuring 
outputs, competition to drive improvement and tight budgetary control.  One key ‘doctrine’ is 
the “disaggregation” of the sector into discrete units, which can be measured, subject to 
competition and so on, essentially creating the conditions for a proliferation of Type-II multi-
level governance structures.  Thus, rather than the state simply withdrawing from certain 
areas, neither fully public nor entirely private hybrid ‘markets’ are created (Sassen 2008: 
199).  In practice, a salient example for nuclear decommissioning in the UK is the system for 
private involvement in the railway: 
 
“… public ownership of the rail system in Britain has been replaced by private 
provision organized on a contractual basis with central government. This is Type II 
governance, not market competition. Central government remains accountable for 
the quality of service, but private firms contract with the government to provide it and, 
for the duration of the contract, they exercise considerable autonomous authority in 
doing so.” (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25) 
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This combines features of a private market (freedom) with those of government (control).  
Depending on your perspective this could be a marriage of the best or worst elements of the 
public and private sectors.  What is not in doubt is that market discipline does not 
necessarily in and of itself improve public services, as seen for railway infrastructure in the 
UK (Sassen 2008: 198).    
 
In the shift from ‘government to governance’ government still has a range of ‘tools’ at its 
disposal to achieve its aims.  The ‘tools of government’ approach (Hood 1986; Hood and 
Margetts 2007) proposes a framework of four ‘tools’ by which government achieves change: 
nodality, authority, treasure and organisation (NATO).  Nodality involves information and the 
ability of government to persuade.  Authority is the ability for government to arrange, instruct 
and enforce structures and rules.  Treasure based tools, or “chequebook-government” (Hood 
1983: 40) involve government incentivising actions.  Finally, organisation tools relate to the 
ability of government to provide directly through, amongst other elements of state 
organisation, its “stock of people” (Hood 1983: 6).  In a broad sense, the traditional public 
administration is reliant on ‘organisation’ tools whereas New Public Management focusses 
on treasury to achieve its aims.  However, in both traditional public administration, with its 
emphasis on hierarchy and strong governmental control, and in the ‘new public 
management’ with its veneration of private sector management techniques, they both over-
rely on a limited, although different, range of ‘tools’.  For NPM in particular one-size fits all 
solutions in the application of market mechanisms to a diverse array of public policy areas is 
a common feature of their ultimate failure (Hood 1991: 3).  Private involvement in the railway 
track, and also attempts to revive the nuclear power industry through incentivising private 
enterprise to build new stations in the 2000s (Baker 2015), are both demonstrative of this 
key issue in public sector reform in the UK.   
 
3 Background: Sellafield as the centre of the UK civil nuclear industry 
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Sellafield is one of the largest nuclear sites in Europe and most complex nuclear sites in the 
world.  Established following the Second World War on the site of a wartime Royal 
Ordinance Factory, Windscale (as Sellafield was known then) was one of the first nuclear 
installations in the UK and hosted the reactors and reprocessing facilities to create plutonium 
for the UK independent atomic weapons programme, made necessary following the United 
States’ 1946 Energy Act which prohibited the sharing of atomic information.  In the 1950s 
Calder Hall, the first commercial atomic power station in the world, was built and opened.  In 
the 1960s the prototype for the UK’s second generation electricity producing reactors, the 
Windscale prototype Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (WAGR) was completed.  
Reprocessing facilities for the fuel from the first generation atomic power reactors expanded.  
This all occurred under the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), which was 
responsible for military and civilian atomic energy.  However, as a consequence of the 
expansion of the nuclear industry, in 1967 the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee recommended the establishment of a dedicated production company to serve the 
fuel demand of the growing reactor fleet.  The Atomic Energy Authority Act 1971 established 
British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL), vesting the new organisation with the fuel cycle 
operations from the UKAEA.  In these early days, through to the 1990s, the majority of 
BNFLs activities were in Cumbria at the Windscale (now Sellafield) site, where the Calder 
Hall reactors, fuel reprocessing facilities and associated waste processing and management 
facilities were located, and to a lesser extent in Lancashire where the fuel fabrication took 
place (Springfields, near Preston) and BNFL’s corporate headquarters were located (Risley, 
near Warrington). 
 
In the thirty years following its creation, BNFL underwent considerable expansion.  In 
Cumbria, significant additions included the construction of the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing 
Plant (THORP) and the Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel manufacture facilities from the mid-1980s to 
late-1990s.  Additionally, in the 1990s BNFL expanded internationally with the founding of a 
US-based decommissioning company BNFL Inc., the purchase of Westinghouse (the 
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nuclear reactor supplier) and the predominantly Asian nuclear business of engineering 
conglomerate ABB.  In addition to new ventures and acquisitions, in the 1990s BNFL was 
given responsibility for the first generation nuclear reactors.  This was following the 1988 
White Paper ‘Privatising Electricity’, which failed to privatise the entire nuclear fleet due to 
the costs of decommissioning and waste management particularly for the first generation 
reactors, and the generally favourable cost of coal, oil and gas generation at the time (HoC 
Research Paper 14/61 2014: 10).  The transfer of the first generation reactors to BNFL 
enabled the more modern AGR and PWR reactors to be privatised as British Energy 
(Rhodes et al 2014: 10).  BNFL was thus, at the turn of the millennium, involved in every 
stage of the nuclear fuel cycle around the globe.  It is at this point, when BNFL was at its 
largest, that the general prospects for the nuclear industry globally were at their lowest 
(Nuttall 2004: 2) and BNFLs own end was only a few years away.  At this point the days of 
“the research tail wagging the end-user’s dog” (Welsh 1994: 43) were becoming a costly 
burden on the nuclear industry globally.  The general trend of the time was to move from 
engineering-led innovation to de-regulate, contract out and move away from state provision 
(Nuttall 2004: 3).  BNFL remained by the early-2000s as large, state owned fuel services 
business which increasingly had to face a challenge of cleaning up legacy facilities, 
particularly at Sellafield, which it was never set up for.  At the time, the organisation also 
faced internal and external pressures, such as a scandal relating to falsification of data 
relating to fuel pellets manufactured at Sellafield, the commissioning and economics of a 
£300 million full-scale mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel facility, BNFLs more general costs and 
performance and poor public opinion of nuclear in general (Quint 2008: 668-9).  In the 1990s 
the solution to these challenges, in the context of the previously proven unsuitability of a 
straightforward privatisation, was to bring private sector expertise and capital to BNFL 
through a Public Private Partnership (PPP).  However, the PPP was delayed by government 
amid safety concerns at Sellafield (Morgan 2000) and eventually completely undermined by 
changes following the White Paper 'Managing the Nuclear Legacy' in 2002.   
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4 ‘Creating a Market’: Rescaling the Nuclear Legacy 
 
4.1 Establishing the NDA 
 
The government published a White Paper ‘Managing the Nuclear Legacy: A Strategy for 
Action’ in 2002 which outlined a new approach to management of the nuclear legacy.  The 
underlying argument was that despite improvements at that time BNFL was not performing 
well enough either in managing historic liabilities or commercial activities (DTI 2002: 49).  
The high cost and financial risk of decommissioning, which had been the barrier to the 
privatisation of these early facilities in the 1980s (Rhodes et al 2014: 32), was only becoming 
more pressing as time passed.  As it was clear that a straightforward privatisation of was not 
an option to which the markets would flock, a new governance arrangement for the nuclear 
legacy was required and the White Paper set out the approach to ‘creating a market’ for 
nuclear decommissioning in the UK.  The new structure proposed to deal with the issue of 
cost and risk by splitting ownership from management, with the aim being to enable the 
creation of a competitive market for contracts to decommissioning sites (DTI 2002: 13).  This 
drew heavily on the M&O contracts which had been a common model for US nuclear sites 
ever since the industry was conceived. 
 
The US experience with the development of atomic weapons was that it was not possible 
without the involvement of research institutions and private industry.  The Manhattan project, 
through the Engineer Corps, used these contracts during the Second World War, and the 
1946 Energy Act stated that the Atomic Energy Commission was required to draw upon all 
available expertise to fulfil its objectives, but in a way compatible with the US commitment to 
private enterprise and free markets, but with a government monopoly on fissile materials 
(DoE 2017: 2).  The purpose being to facilitate long-term private management and operation 
of government owned facilities, which required two distinctive elements of M&O contracts; 
they do not specify detailed outputs, reflecting the unknown nature of research objectives 
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which cannot be specified adequately early, and they are open-ended (extend or compete 
clauses) which means, should they be performing well, these contracts may roll on 
indefinitely.  The US Supreme Court stated it was "virtually impossible to describe the 
contractual relationship in standard … terms" because "while subject to the general direction 
of government, the contractors are vested with substantial autonomy" (DoE 2017: 5).  While 
clearly intended to address the specific challenges of attempting to marry the certainty of a 
contract with the uncertainty of research, M&O contracts do come with drawbacks.  In 1994 
the DoE was criticised for failing to hold these contracts sufficiently to account for 
performance, and consequently the DoE cut the number of these contracts and reformed the 
remaining ones (DoE 2017: 8).  Despite reform, the central challenge of this type of contract 
will always be how to adequately specify and judge performance against unknown 
challenges and novel solutions.  This M&O model was the basis for the owner/operator 
relationship established in the UK following the 2002 White Paper and the same challenges 
were similarly relevant to the suitability of these types of contract for UK decommissioning. 
 
The proposed structure guaranteed the state taking risk through ownership and funding, 
while the private sector management took risk with regards performance against a contract.  
The 2002 White Paper led to the establishment of the Liabilities Management Authority, 
which took ownership of sites from BNFL and UKAEA.  The LMA became the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority following the Energy Act 2004.  The task for the NDA was to 
achieve “safe, cost-effective, accelerated and environmentally responsible 
decommissioning” and this would be achieved by “creating competitive decommissioning 
and clean-up markets” (NDA 2006: 6).  The creation of these markets involved a process of 
competitions for the shares in Site Licence Companies, and the management and operation 
of NDA owned sites.  The transfer of shares in the SLC to the PBO, rather than awarding a 
management contract, is due to nuclear site licencing requiring the operator of the site to be 
the licence holder (CMA 2008). 
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Figure 1 – NDA’s first contracting model 
 
4.2 Contracting out the Sellafield Site 
 
Following the creation of the LMA and through the establishment of the NDA in 2005, the 
future arrangements for BNFL and UKAEA was to move into the private sector, and then 
potentially compete for the new contracts to operate the sites (DTI 2002: 13).  The idea of 
public sector even being able to bid was not considered “appropriate” by government (DTI 
2002: 50).  For both BNFL the path to the private sector was not set in 2002, but a public-
private partnership (PPP) has been the preferred option for BNFL for some years (DTI 2002: 
49-50). In parallel with the transfer of assets and liabilities to the LMA, and BNFL thus 
becoming a contractor, a joint review with the Department of Trade and Industry concluded 
there was significant value in BNFL for sale in parts, in particular those businesses overseas 
such as Westinghouse and the clean-up business in the USA, BNG America (formerly BNFL 
Inc.).  This sale of large parts of BNFL meant that the remaining UK business, British 
Nuclear Group (BNG), would not according to the Government have “the required critical 
mass” for a PPP (HoC Deb 18 May 2006: C1179). 
 
Following the establishment of the NDA in 2005, and in line with the timeframe in the 2002 
White Paper, it was envisaged that competitions for site contracts would begin with the 
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smallest site in 2006 (the Low Level Waste Repository) and leave Sellafield until 2012, after 
reprocessing the spent fuel from the UKs first generation of nuclear reactors was intended to 
be complete (NDA 2006: 12). However, the timescale for these sites had to be brought 
forward after the board of BNFL decided to break its UK business up rather than sell BNG 
whole (NDA 2007: 32). This decision by BNFL was problematic for the NDA as the timescale 
for site contracting was predicated upon the British Nuclear Group element of BNFL being 
sold as a single company, with a guaranteed initial five-year contract to manage the 
Sellafield site from 2007-2012 aimed at making the sale more attractive to potential private 
investors (Griffiths 2006).  However, during the summer of 2006, the BNFL board decided to 
break up BNG and sell the assets off individually, due to fears that private companies 
interested in BNG, principally Fleur and Bechtel from the United States, were planning to buy 
BNG and then break it up themselves, making a significant amount of money (Parkinson 
2006).  The move to find a private-sector owner of the Sellafield Site Licence Company, 
British Nuclear Group Sellafield Limited (BNGSL) by competition was therefore precipitated 
by “the change in strategic approach by British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) regarding the 
future of British Nuclear Group Sellafield Limited (BNGSL)” (NDA 2007: 32).  This led the 
NDA to “agree and favour an early competition for Sellafield” (NDA 2006: 151).  
Consequently the option was taken to bring forward from 2012 to 2007 the contract 
competition to find a Parent Body Organisation (PBO) for the Sellafield site.    
 
The decision to let the contract for BNG Sellafield Ltd to a private company effectively ended 
the prospect of BNG competing for and undertaking work overseas (Griffiths 2006), which 
had been the intention since the 2002 White Paper (DTI 2002: 49).  The new organisation, 
Sellafield Ltd, would become an arms-length subsidiary of other multi-national organisations. 
This was achieved in 2008, when the competition for the contract to own and manage 
Sellafield Ltd led to Nuclear Management Partners (NMP) being awarded a contract for up to 
seventeen years.  NMP was a consortium of three large multi-national companies with 
significant experience in the nuclear industry set up specifically to bid for the contract for 
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Sellafield Ltd.  The three companies were, at the time, American company Washington 
Group (later URS and later still Aecom), British company AMEC (later Amec Foster Wheeler) 
and French company Areva.   
 
The contract for management of the Sellafield site was supposed “to improve performance 
through innovation, greater incentive arrangements and a higher risk/reward profile” (NDA 
2006: 63).  For the NDA contractorisation would bring “UK and international best practice to 
bear on our mission” by “specifying the outcomes we seek rather than the work to be 
performed and rewarding cost effective delivery” (NDA 2011a: 13).  For SLC contracts, 
which are “typically high value, high risk” contracts, the overarching aim is to maintain and 
enhance the capability of the SLC as an enduring entity (NDA 2011a: 2.2) which aids later 
re-contracting and the long-term operation and safety of the sites.  However, ownership of 
the SLC is intended to give the necessary level of control to provide the “direction, 
leadership and management” (NDA 2011a: 2.2) to implement significant change as 
envisaged by the PBO/SLC model (NDA 2013: 9).  The NDA contracting principles actively 
encourage a significant level of control for the PBO over the SLC.  The way in which 
contracts are let, particularly the high value and high risk critical contracts for site 
management, is intended to give the longest possible term and greatest possible freedoms 
within the constraints of ensuring operational endurance of the SLC, in line with the 
development of M&O contracts in the US industry.  The contracts thus have long durations 
and wide scope, specifically to give the PBO the greatest level of influence over the SLC 
(NDA 2011b: 2.3). 
 
To incentivise the delivery of the contracting principles, the NDA employed what it termed 
“Trust with Consequences”, which means that by default both internally and externally its 
stakeholders and suppliers are given “the responsibility, autonomy and authority within 
delegations to deliver the required performance in the way they see most appropriate” (NDA 
2011b: 2.4).  The clear implication of the NDA approach to contracting and incentivisation is 
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to give as great a scope as possible to the contractor in the day-to-day operation of their 
contracts for the longest practical time.  In seeking to create and sustain a demand from 
suppliers to participate in the market for clean-up contracts, these principals and 
incentivisation methods make sense i.e. suppliers are more likely to bid for contracts where 
they are given certainty as to the funding.  However, despite the wide scope granted in 
theory to the PBO by ownership and the secondment of senior management into the SLC, 
the contractual nature of the relationship meant the freedom was in practice very constrained 
to the extent that it was not possible, as was later separately confirmed by the experience of 
the early termination of the PBO contract for the Magnox sites decommissioning, to specify 
the contract to reflect the work required (HC Deb 27 March 2017, c 554WS).   
 
The incentive based element of the fee structure of the PBO model has three main elements 
(NAO 2015: 18): 
 Efficiency savings;  
 Performance in meeting project milestones; and,  
 Removal of work from the programme without affecting overall progress on the site. 
On the first category, while Sellafield did make considerable efficiency savings of £715 
million over first five year period of NMP as the PBO, as compared to a target of £699 million 
(NAO 2015: 18), this came at a cost to meeting the second major incentive based fee 
category.  NMP was criticised by consultants KPMG for the “undesirable consequences” of a 
focus on achieving short-term efficiencies at Sellafield which resulted in a “lack of focus on 
schedule performance, particularly for major projects” which “ultimately cost more than the 
efficiency savings” (KPMG 2013: 110).  This criticism was confirmed and extended by 
investigations and reports from both the National Audit Office (NAO 2012; 2015) and the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC 2013; 2015).  The NAO noted that in the 2011/12 financial 
year only two of the NDA’s 14 major projects at Sellafield were delivering as planned, 
incurring additional costs of £0.9 billion, far in excess of efficiencies achieved, costing NMP 
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£19 million of their £74 million potential fee (NAO 2012: 8).  However, overall costs rose for 
five key reasons including contractor capacity, pre-NDA issues around poorly designed 
facilities, and weak oversight by the NDA (NAO 2015: 8-10).  However, the remaining two 
issues are more directly related to the structure of M&O type contracts and deserve more 
detailed consideration.  Firstly, costs rose due to an inability to transfer risk to NMP as the 
owner, such that the NDA reimbursed all acceptable costs to Sellafield Ltd meaning that 
Sellafield does not bear risks and is less incentivised to avoid delays and cost increases 
(NAO 2015: 8).  The remaining issue identified by the NAO relating to cost increases 
impacts on the fee structure of the PBO contract, and relates to poor cost and schedule 
estimation by Sellafield both during and before NMP’s ownership.  The final major element of 
the fee incentive was reducing the cost and complexity of the overall work programme, but 
the assumptions which underpinned the plan which NMP inherited proved to be inaccurate, 
and changes led to the total costs of the potential 17 year PBO tenure rising from £18.2 to 
£24.6 billion, and lifetime costs from £46.6 to £64.5 billion and further rises anticipated, but 
with little increase in ability and capacity to better estimate as a result of NMP ownership 
(NAO 2015: 7).   
 
This final point relates to the capacity of Sellafield Ltd and returns this exploration of the 
governance of the nuclear legacy to where these changes began, the 2002 White Paper.  
The White Paper stated clearly that for the NDA, and wider new structure, performance and 
confidence were the two essential ingredients for success: 
“The LMA will be publicly accountable for its performance and operate on an open 
and transparent basis. It will be judged not just on its operational performance and 
cost effectiveness but also on its ability to command public confidence.” (DTI 
2002: 13, emphasis added) 
 
While NMP did made progress and efficiencies at Sellafield, there remained concerns in 
particular about the inability to improve the capacity of the site licence company (Clarke 
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2014: 2).  This raises on-going concerns for its ability to perform, on top of the already mixed 
performance of both NMP and the NDA as the accountable body, which would risk a breach 
of one of the conditions of the site licence granted by the Office for Nuclear Regulation, 
specifically condition 36 the “Organisational capability” of the licensee which states that “the 
licensee shall provide and maintain adequate financial and human resources to ensure the 
safe operation of the licensed site” (ONR 2016a: 22). 
 
Wider ability to command public confidence was further eroded by a series of events which 
were smaller in scale and cost, but still damaging to the wider public perception.  The House 
of Commons Committee on Public Accounts stated in 2013 that "we are not yet convinced 
that taxpayers are getting a good deal from the Authority’s arrangement with Nuclear 
Management Partners" and singling out in particular "the costs of seconding staff from 
Nuclear Management Partners’ parent companies" which the committee argued, after taking 
evidence, "appear excessively high, especially given the wage rates in the local economy" 
(PAC 2013: 3).  This was further exacerbated by scandal surrounding the expenses paid to 
these seconded executives, which included a trip to the US Masters golf tournament, a taxi 
for one executive and their cat and company credit cards used for personal flights to the US 
by seconded executives, which was branded “a sickening waste of public money” by the 
local MP (BBC 2013). 
 
4.3 Market Enhanced Site Licence Company 
 
As with M&O contracts in the USA, the PBO model in the UK did not remain static, with only 
the “small scale” and “simple” LLWR site remaining in its original form within the first ten 
years of these contracts being let (Clarke 2014: 2).   The Sellafield PBO contract did not 
work, and was not modified, because the scope of the task was not specifiable and the SLC 
had major capability issues (Clarke 2014: 2).  This would later prove to be the case at the 
Magnox sites, particularly in relation to the specification of the work required.  At Sellafield 
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the unsuitability of the PBO model was attributed by the NDA to the competition process by 
which the four potential PBOs were evaluated, which resulted in commitments being made 
which the NDA found were not able to be transformed into contractual commitments, and as 
a consequence these were not delivered (Clarke 2014: 5).  The general thrust of the problem 
was that for one of the most complex nuclear sites in the world, and despite the NDAs 
original intention to specify “the outcomes we seek rather than the work to be performed” 
(NDA 2011: 13), a contractorised relationship between the site owner and the site operator 
was too restrictive.  John Clarke, Chief Executive of the NDA when NMP lost their contract to 
operate Sellafield, said:   
 
“The relationship between the NDA and Sellafield Ltd as a subsidiary will be more 
flexible than that which is based on a commercial contract. It will therefore be better 
able to cope with uncertainty and focus on long term outcomes.” (Sellafield 2016: 11) 
 
As explored earlier, the PBO model transfers significant power to the private sector. The 
NDA concluded that to transfer the entire scope of the operations of a site as large as 
Sellafield violated “good commercial practice” given that while the NDA has a sole purpose, 
to decommissioning its sites and site licence companies have a sole purpose to carry out the 
NDA mission at their site, the PBO could only be aligned with this in so far as it could be 
specified in a contract, which was not always possible (Clarke 2014: 5).  Therefore, despite 
awarding NMP a second five-year instalment of their seventeen-year contract in 2013, only 
two years later in 2015 the NDA decided to terminate the NMP contract and alter the model 
for the management and operation for the Sellafield site to a ‘Market Enhanced Model’ 
(MEM) with effect from 1 April 2016 (NDA 2016).  This new model simplified the ownership 
and operation of the Sellafield site by making the Site Licence Company, and therefore the 
workforce, a wholly owned subsidiary of the NDA.  However, despite this return to complete 
public control, the NDA continued to believe that “private sector approaches and disciplines 
will add value” (Clarke 2014: 3) but through a “conventional” approach rather than the 
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“bespoke PBO model” (Clarke 2014: 4).  This ‘conventional’ approach means the private 
sector being engaged below the level of the SLC, either on site-wide strategic partnering 
arrangements or specific projects, rather than above it as owner and manager.  This model 
has been used in the delivery of the 2012 Olympics and Crossrail, both very large 
infrastructure projects in London (NAO 2015: 25). 
 
A key element of the new model is “workforce reform” (Clarke 2014: 5).  New terms and 
conditions are being introduced which include lower pay and longer hours for new starters as 
well as other internal changes to pay, grading and so on (Sellafield Ltd 2016b: 26).   The 
driver for this change is twofold: firstly, there is the imperative to reduce costs and increase 
productivity; secondly, and more significantly, the status of the site as a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the NDA places at risk exemptions which Sellafield has to wider public sector 
pay and conditions standards. These were, specifically, the Expenditure Review Group 
(ERG) Controls which aimed to reduce wasteful government spending, the public pay policy 
which deals with public sector workers’ pay, and the caps placed on senior executive 
remuneration (Cabinet Office 2014).  The outline business case for the MEM transition 
recognised that “increased proximity to government in the market enhanced SLC model” 
placed these exemptions at risk (NDA 2014b: 78).  Specifically, the exemption on 
remuneration and pay had been based on Sellafield Ltd being in private sector ownership 
(NDA 2014b: 78).  The specific case made for these exemptions to continue is redacted from 
the business case, but the implication is that these exemptions were only allowed on the 
basis of workforce reform: 
It should be clear that the NDA is not seeking any further exemptions than those 
currently in place, and we fully understand the need to improve efficiency at 
Sellafield, including through workforce reform, which the NDA has committed to carry 
out within three years of model change (Clarke 2014: 5) 
The new model, in bringing the site out of private ownership and into a closer relationship 
with government than it even had in the days of BNFL has therefore significant implications 
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for the workforce, and consequently the wider community.  The potential changes of 
workforce reform will be, as the local MP (at the time of model change) argued, “significant” 
and have a “ripple effect” due to the dominance of the site in the total local workforce 
(Sellafield 2016b: 37). 
 
 
Figure 2 – The Market Enhanced Site Licence Company model 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
The problem with marketisation of ownership of the nuclear legacy at Sellafield stems 
ultimately from the very nature of the problem being addressed.  The ‘known unknowns’ and 
‘unknown unknowns’ inherent in decommissioning first of their kind, sixty-year-old nuclear 
facilities are ill-suited to being addressed by the SLC and PBO model.  This model, driven by 
the need for the state to retain ownership of the sites and their associated risks (economic, 
in particular), constrained the way in which the private sector was engaged in the 
decommissioning challenge.  
 
Given that the problem cannot be completely defined in advance, a contractual relationship 
which sets terms in stone at the outset of a relationship is challenging.  While the model did 
explicitly attempt to grant the PBO the greatest possible freedom to act, ultimately if the 
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scope of the work deviates from the terms of the contract with the NDA then the PBO has a 
duty to its shareholders to ensure the contract is varied and the payment reflect the work 
carried out.  The rigidity of a contractual relationship was exacerbated, as the NDA 
recognised, by the scale at which private involvement was integrated into the governance of 
the nuclear legacy in the PBO model.  The scope required of a contract covering such a 
diverse site as Sellafield proved near impossible to achieve.   This difficult period of private 
sector ownership of the Sellafield site demonstrates the problems inherent with over-reliance 
on simplistic solutions.  Contracting below the level of the site licence company has never 
been uncommon, particularly for civil engineering and construction.  However, in the 
application of specific management and nuclear expertise to the general operation of the 
site, this was either fully nationalised under BNFL or fully contractorised under the PBO 
model.  Placing the contractual relationship with the private sector for nuclear expertise 
between the site licence company the NDA, the government precluded itself from employing 
the full range of ‘tools’ at its disposal.  Effective governmental control was not possible.  
What we see for the nuclear legacy, therefore, is not a privatisation or a marketization, nor a 
re-nationalisation, but the creation and ongoing modification of a Type-II multi-level 
governance system as part of the ‘disaggregation’ of the state.  Despite the predictions of 
MLG, the state is not diminished by this change and its ‘unique position’ is clearly 
demonstrated.   
 
A broader point this case demonstrates is that even for the broad conception of governance 
in contemporary society, embracing a diverse array of actors, government is not diminished 
and ‘creating a market’ does not necessarily mean ‘withdrawing the state’.  The problems 
resulting from an over-reliance on market mechanisms for the management of the Sellafield 
site was a result of the complexity and uncertainty of the site and the consequent inability to 
adequately specify a contract.  While it might be tempting to fall back on government alone 
to operate the Sellafield site, past experience of nationalised ownership of UK industry, and 
the principle of over-reliance on any one model or tool caution against this simple solution.  It 
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may have been the case that, had BNFL not been broken up in 2006 and able to operate the 
Sellafield site as a nationalised company, but with the NDA as a customer in a newly 
competitive environment, their performance may have improved beyond 2007.   The 
principle of the role of competitive contracts, market mechanisms and private sector 
involvement were not challenged by the experience of NMP, rather the challenge was to the 
governance architecture which placed these mechanisms at the inappropriate scale, as 
owner of the Site Licence Company.  The PBO model was unsuitable because it maintained 
the worst aspects of BNFL as an arms-length company, the very much intended lack of 
effective state control (Rhodes et al 2014: 35), and added to it the difficulty of specifying and 
altering a contract in an environment of significant technical challenge (Clarke 2014), or 
‘known unknowns’.  The direct control over the day-to-day running of the site being brought 
back under public control, but with greater market involvement than was the case under 
BNFL through strategic partnering at a level below the SLC, addresses this problem on 
paper and has successfully been deployed for large projects in the UK at the London 
Olympics and for Crossrail (NAO 2015: 25).  Time will now tell if it can be made to work 
effectively, and potentially replicated for the other troubled contracts, for managing the UK 
nuclear legacy. 
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